




Applied ethics, i.e. the issue of norms and values 
in the choices of everyday life
Without the civic morality  
societies die; 
Without personal morality  
they are not worth surviving. 
(H. E. Fosdick)
Nowadays, in  social life ethics 
seems to appear only in moments 
when topics of great caliber such as abortion, euthanasia or death pen-
alty are discussed. At that time numerous authorities appear in the media 
that discuss the problem. Ethics, however, is not common in everyday life 
issues in both aspects of private and professional life. Although in every-
day life there are difficult and complicated situations requiring heroism 
and sacrifice, we are much more likely to face problems of a smaller scale. 
There are ambiguous situations where one expects a particular position, 
support for some or disapproval of other behaviors, a moral evaluation 
of a specific situation, refusal when someone submits immoral proposals 
or simply “ordinary” honesty. Every day we adhere to the different laws 
regulating “our being” at home, at work or in the shop, but we do it often 
mechanically, we do certain orders or we react to bans without thinking 
about them. The aim of the study is to draw attention to the legitimacy 
of speaking about ethics in everyday life and reflection on issues related 
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to (im)moral choices. In the resolution of these problems concepts such 
as  standards, values, assessments or  a  wide plane of  the distinction 
 between good and evil may be helpful.
1. The category of good and evil
In everyday practice we use the common sense distinction of good 
and evil, unfortunately this border is often moved to areas that would 
be difficult to call ethical anymore. It seems that the history of reflec-
tion on this issue and the establishment of the boundary between the 
concepts is as long as the functioning of rational beings in the universe. 
Some attempts to define these concepts are already found in Homer’s 
works and from the stories of gods and heroes one can pick out the 
advantages important for the ancients like honor, courage but also 
cunning or friendship. Not only the texts of Greek poets but also great 
 philosophers took up these issues.
In the philosophical tradition the issue of good and evil has appeared 
many times, and in seeking the answer to the question of how we can 
define them, we find in the history of philosophical ideas a wealth of dif-
ferent answers. Both ontologically and epistemologically, we can find 
equally strong definitions, which are often mutually exclusive. From 
an ontological point of view it seems that at least three different notions 
are possible, including dualism of beings of good and evil where their 
status is equally strong and both forces clash with the course of the uni-
verse, and only depending on which force in the moment wins, the world 
appears to us as a creation with a predominance of good or evil. The 
second concept may indicate the original being of evil where good turns 
out to be only a secondary category. Evil is ontologically primitive, and 
if good appears ever in the world it is only because of free rational beings. 
The last concept is the idea of  evil as non-being. Evil does not exist as in 
itself it is not a character of being and at most it is the cause – like in the 
previous approach – of a human being. A supporter of this approach was 
St. Augustine who argued that in reality what we perceive as evil is only 
a lesser good without which the world would not be as beautiful as it is. 
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Reality appears as a work of art where contrasts do not disturb but even 
make the beauty of the whole visible. Moans caused by suffering do not 
destroy the ideal symphony of the world. In the discussion of the onto-
logical lack of what evil is supposed to be, Leszek Kołakowski’s solutions 
are close to me.1 It is worth quoting the legend of the tyranny of Falarys, 
which Kołakowski quotes in Polityka i diabeł.2 According to the tradi-
tion, Falarys had a bull with bronze, inside which his opponents were 
burned alive. The statue was constructed in such a way that thanks to the 
acoustic device the moans of the victims emerged outside as a pleasant 
melody. Perhaps our world is such a bull, and the effect, now unimag-
inable to us, will once appear as a beautiful symphony, but this answer 
is not only cruel but also unconvincing. As you can see, it  is difficult 
to find an indisputable solution; perhaps it will be easier if we deal with 
norms and values.
2. What are norms?
It seems that we can assume that a habit, a custom and a religion, 
or broadly understood culture were the first forms of regulation of inter-
personal relations, the first codes of conduct of people towards each other. 
In ordinary terms, a norm is a rule, a recipe. If you look at such state-
ments for example: “Do not lie,” “You must not deprive anyone of life,” 
“Every citizen of such and such age is entitled to vote,” “We should respect 
the environment” can be concluded that the statements that they are 
considered norms have a different form. They can be expressed in the 
form of a decree, ordering and even an imperative. It seems that they 
mainly fulfill a duty and a prescriptive function regulating social life. The 
norms of a custom have had the type of sanctioning of the community’s 
opinion, a direct rigorous regulatory norm whose sanction works quick-
ly. The process of  society development involves stretching sanctions 
 1 J. Stecko, Prywacyjna koncepcja zła w interpretacji Leszka Kołakowskiego, „Humanities and 
Social Sciences” 18 (2013) no. 20 (1), pp. 97–103.
 2 L. Kołakowski, Moje słuszne poglądy na wszystko, Kraków 1999.
92 Justyna Stecko
over time. It has become in religious norms ultimately after death, will 
not pass over anyone and will always be just. In turn, the legal sanction 
is more immediate, but definitely less fair. Although all these sanctions 
have a non-marital dimension, they do not exclude the fact that they 
can overlap and even strengthen each other. At this point we should also 
mention so often discussed legal norms which regulate in a significant 
way social life. Ossowska states that such classification is fluent: one and 
the same norm forbidding us, for example, telling a lie or a deception 
can be treated as a legal norm, or as a moral norm, depending on the 
emotion that accompanies it at the moment or also not.3 With regard 
to our subordinates we should act honestly – this is a one-sided order 
(i.e. a moral norm), while when we consider the requirement of integrity 
as the right of subordinates who expect it, we are talking about a legal 
norm. When we talk about norms we should also differentiate between 
individual norms and those that apply to entire social groups. A man, 
being a social being, cannot live in isolation from others, and this creates 
new perspectives (possibilities of being for others and with others), but 
also new tasks.
The division of norms which could be quoted here is a large amount, 
but this is not the purpose of this study, the key conclusion seems to be 
Władysław Witwicki’s conclusion, which states: “Moral behavior is just 
what oil in a social machine. It reduces the inevitable friction and allows 
the course of social life, without spoiling the social machine. Normative 
ethics is a rational set of recipes for this lubricant and the provisions 
of its use.”4 Let’s move to the norms that directly point to the ethical area.
3. Ethical standards
The singularity of ethical norms is that they are respected regardless 
of  external sanctions and appear to  be related to  the “moral maturi-
ty” of a human being. The motive for ethical conduct is not an external 
 3 M. Ossowska, Normy moralne. Próba systematyzacji, Warszawa 1985, p. 45.
 4 W. Witwicki, Pogadanki obyczajowe, Warszawa 1957, p. 20. 
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reward or punishment, but a value in itself. Ethicists have distinguished 
many different types of divisions due to various criteria, among others 
due to their genesis or a scope of application. For the purpose of this 
study, I would just like to quote the distinction that Maria Ossowska 
proposed.
These are standards:




In addition, there are standards for social relations:
• serving the need for trust,
• guarding justice,
• and mitigating social conflicts.
Ossowska also pointed out meta-norms:
• a rule of principles that says that it  is necessary to treat beings 
 belonging to the same category in the same way,
• Kant’s imperative,
• the principle of  consequences in  assessing, and that prohibits 
 treating oneself differently from others,
• a rule that nobody can be both a judge and a party to a given case,
• a rule regulating the scope and conditions of validity of norms.5
Unfortunately, there is no universally accepted way to justify moral 
norms or entire ethical theories. The most important ways of justifying 
moral norms that can be found in textbooks include the teleologism 
of Aristotle; the hedonism of epicureans, the perfectionism of the stoics, 
theistic justifications of ethics, modern theories of natural rights, the-
ories of  social contract, Kantism, counter-updating, ethical intuition-
ism, personalism and various varieties of ethical naturalism.6 However, 
it seems that for the purposes of this study it is enough to indicate only 
that there is a whole reservoir of different solutions and the problem 
 5 M. Ossowska, Normy moralne…, op. cit., p. 89.
 6 V. J. Bourke, Historia etyki, Toruń 1994.
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is not zero-based. The binding of moral values  with other values  may 
consist in  the fact that moral norms are assigned the task of serving 
to defend certain goods, such as life, freedom and security. Therefore, 
the necessary condition for the existence of moral norms is the existence 
of some goods or we can directly name values.
4. Axiological awareness and values
The problem of morality has always been the problem of the subject. 
Without the subject, morality would be  in a vacuum, it would be no 
man’s morality. The moral character of an act is determined by the cir-
cumstances and meanings assigned to it by the subject. Movement with 
the leg can be a banal muscle activity or an action in the ethical sense, 
it is enough that the person making it consciously wants to hurt or help 
the other.7 Moral awareness is a kind of axiological consciousness which 
is our sensitivity to any value. So it is this ability that estimates responsi-
bility for the good or evil that we have done to another human being. It is 
a certain attribute that accompanies a man. The axiological conscious-
ness, due to its phenomenological origin, is based mainly on qualitative 
methods and will be realized more as an anthology of contributions than 
hard theory.
Speaking of values, it is impossible not to mention the division of Max 
Scheler.8 He created a hierarchy of values by distinguishing four levels. 
The principle of this division is such features as: duration, range, inde-
pendence and depth of satisfaction. By using these criteria he prepared 
his own hierarchy of values. Sensory values  are the lowest, including 
items of both pleasure and pain, as well as various useful goods. In the 
second place he set the vital values, such as pros and cons, or a strength 
and a weakness.
 7 Oblicza doświadczenia aksjologicznego. Studia i rozprawy, red. P. Duchliński, G. Hołub, 
Kraków 2011. 
 8 V. J. Bourke, Historia etyki, op. cit., p. 240.
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 The next are spiritual values, e.g. knowledge of truth, righteousness 
and lawlessness. For the highest, he adopted religious values, to which 
he included happiness and despair, as well as feelings of sanctity and 
opposition to them. Scheler also pointed out that there were two types 
of duties: being and acting. The duty of action is based on being, creat-
ing together the basis of moral obligation. Moral values, however, are 
not equivalent to the levels described above. They arise when a person 
realizes a value from a higher level before a value from a  lower level, 
or submits the former above the other. It follows from this that moral 
values  are personal values, and moral obligation consists in responding 
to the aforementioned values.9 Another representative of contemporary 
axiological ethics was Nicolai Hartmann.  He believes that the values 
can be learned in an intuitive way using cognitive and emotional acts 
of consciousness. In his dissertations, he emphasized that the object val-
ues  were not subjective states of consciousness, nor are they physically 
existing entities. They are a separate area – an ideal reality. Individuals 
are more or less open to value experience. The feeling is the most impor-
tant in the initial opening to values.10 By creating a hierarchy of values 
Hartmann relied heavily on the value of Scheler’s, while criticizing his 
simplification. In contrast, Hartmann believed that higher values  were 
based on lower values, and were even somewhat dependent on them. 
In the Hartmann’s hierarchy of values  there are: elementary values, val-
ues  conditioning the internal content of the subject, e.g. life, suffering, 
strength and moral values; basic ones such as nobility, good and specific 
values: wisdom, bravery, justice. This juxtaposition is a complex system 
of objective criteria for what is valuable.11
For a man it should be important to be an evaluating attitude, in fact 
every act can be subject to moral evaluation. In everyday life we often 
occupy a particular valuing attitude – something is good and something 
bad – the choice may assume not only valuation but also hierarchization. 
 9 V. J. Bourke, Historia etyki, op. cit., p. 243.
 10 V. J. Bourke, Historia etyki, op. cit., p. 243.
 11 V. J. Bourke, Historia etyki, op. cit., p. 243.
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Moral judgments, or value judgments refer to human acts. They can 
be specific (they occur when they express an evaluation of a human act 
fulfilled in a specific place and time) or general (they adjudicate about the 
good or moral evil of a specific species specific category of human acts).
According to Maria Gołaszewska the world of axiology is unfortunate-
ly not white and black and the choices are not always obvious. What’s 
more, we often encounter a category of greater or lesser good or less 
or greater evil. There is a “common belief that there is a lesser evil and 
a greater evil, that certain human behaviors, as well as states of affairs, 
can be ranked due to the moment of their relationship with certain values 
- negative and positive ones.”12 “Chessboard” of values  is a set of possi-
bilities, it seems, close to their essential properties. There is polarization 
here: positive values  – negative (pendant for white and black figures); and 
there is no suggestion that any of them have any “privileges” in the system, 
but they are opposed. There is also a gradation, from the value of “more 
important,” higher, to those whose functions in the anthropist are lim-
ited to “one-dimensional” values, with a small range of influence. But 
what is the most important here is the system of movements, the system 
of possibilities of mutual influence of values  on oneself and on the man 
whom we place among the highest values. The rules of the game of chess 
are precise, but at the same time they allow a finite but an uncountable 
number of moves, combinations, until reaching the situation in which the 
next move, the next axiological possibility no longer exists.”13 According 
to Gołaszewska, not only can we rank good indicating the effects of ac-
tions. Since evil can have different degrees of severity, then we can and 
even should rank its manifestations. Gołaszewska distinguishes several 
stages of evil: moral indifference, evil project, passive evil, active evil and 
ambiguous evil. The anthroposphere does not include objective evil, oc-
curring outside the consciousness of the “I” in the form of natural world 
events. It is not subject to valuation in ethical terms, although it may 
cause suffering to people and is, therefore, anthropomorphized by the 
 12 M. Gołaszewska, Fascynacja złem. Eseje z teorii wartości, Warszawa–Kraków 1994, p. 194.
 13 M. Gołaszewska, Fascynacja złem, op. cit., s. 194.
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assignment of some axiological qualification. It seems that each of these 
stages of evil is characteristic of contemporary man.
5. Conclusions
Almost the entire history of  the philosophy of  morality consists 
in the attempt to find the right pattern for making decisions, judging 
actions and justifying acts. So what will it be for applied ethics? It seems 
that it  is nothing more than applying certain concepts of  normative 
ethics to  concrete, practical ethical problems in  order to  normalize 
the consideration of duties or answers about good and evil in specific 
situations. It  seems, however, that the key conclusion here is  not the 
answer to  what standards we  should act and what values  to  follow 
and the reflection on  the world of  values, choices and assessments 
in everyday life. An action that is not blind, mindless, or subordinate 
to  the only value that egoistic pleasure currently is. It  seems that the 
ethics of  everyday life should be  the component that distinguishes 
the human world. Unfortunately, looking at  young Europeans today, 
it  is difficult to be optimistic. In most sociologists’ research on hones-
ty, truthfulness, faithfulness and simple decency, respondents choose 
to live without such rules, treating them as a relic of the past or simply 
naivety. But what will be  the world like where we  treat the other per-
son only as  a  bridge to  pleasure, success and egoistical impressions? 
Is such the world a place where we would like to live? Perhaps a simple 
Kantian principle would be enough (of course, taking into account the 
objections connected with it) to treat the other person as we would like 
to be treated but the key conclusion remains the need to reflect on the 
ethics of everyday life.
References
Bourke V. J., Historia etyki, Toruń 1994.
Gołaszewska M., Fascynacja złem. Eseje z teorii wartości, Warszawa–Kraków 1994.
Kołakowski L., Moje słuszne poglądy na wszystko, Kraków 1999.
98 Justyna Stecko
Oblicza doświadczenia aksjologicznego. Studia i rozprawy, red. P. Duchliński, G. Hołub, 
Kraków 2011.
Ossowska M., Normy moralne. Próba systematyzacji, Warszawa 1985.
Stecko J., Prywacyjna koncepcja zła w interpretacji Leszka Kołakowskiego, „Humanities 
and Social Sciences” 20 (2013) no. 1, s. 97–104.
Witwicki W., Pogadanki obyczajowe, Warszawa 1957.
Abstract
Applied ethics, i.e. the issue of norms and values  
in the choices of everyday life
Valuation and evaluation are inevitable in life. They concern both making personal 
choices and assessing facts. In the world where we live, ethics seems to appear only when 
social issues such as abortion, euthanasia or the death penalty go to the discussion. Ethics, 
however, is not common in the issues of everyday life, in the choices that accompany us on 
every level of life. In both private and public life one can notice more and more blind 
momentum, more and more tasks but also we set the boundary between good and evil 
with greater difficulty. It seems that the diagnosis regarding the axiological crisis seems 
more and more accurate today. The common belief that it is allowed to do so because 
“everyone does it” is nothing more than a mindless imitation of social behavior or just 
plain ignorance of ethics. According to Seneca the thing which is not prohibited by the 
law is prohibited by shame, it seems that today the shame, which in this sentence was 
a synonym of “awareness” or “ethical sensitivity” ceased to exist. The aim of this article 
is a brief reflection on the ethics of contemporary man, on the way how he makes choic-
es, and actually on the basis of what he should take. The inspiration for writing this text 
was the author’s personal experience, which indicates the lack of optimism in assessing 
the moral condition of a modern man.
Keywords
norms, values, axionormative area, ethics of everyday life
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Abstrakt
Etyka stosowana czyli zagadnienie norm i wartości  
w wyborach życia codziennego
Wartościowanie i ocenianie jest w życiu nieuniknione. Dotyczy ono zarówno dokony-
wania osobistych wyborów, jak i oceniania faktów. W świecie, w którym przyszło nam żyć, 
etyka wydaje się pojawiać dopiero w momentach, gdy do dyskusji trafiają istotne tematy 
społeczne, takie jak aborcja, eutanazja czy kara śmierci. Etyka nie jest jednak powszech-
na w zagadnieniach życia codziennego, w wyborach, które towarzyszą nam na każdej 
płaszczyźnie życia. Zarówno w życiu prywatnym, jak i publicznym coraz więcej ślepego 
pędu, coraz więcej wyznaczamy sobie zadań, ale też z większym trudem wyznaczamy 
granicę między dobrem i złem. Wydaje się, że współcześnie coraz bardziej trafna wydaje 
się diagnoza dotycząca kryzysu aksjologicznego. Powszechne przekonanie, że wolno tak 
robić, ponieważ „wszyscy to robią”, to nic innego, jak bezmyślne naśladowanie zachowań 
społecznych bądź po prostu zwykła ignorancja wobec etyki. Zdaniem Seneki – czego nie 
zabrania prawo, zabrania wstyd. Wydaje się, że dzisiaj wstyd, który w tej sentencji był 
synonimem „świadomości” czy „wrażliwości” etycznej, przestał istnieć. Celem artykułu 
jest krótka refleksja nad etyką współczesnego człowieka, nad sposobem, w jaki podej-
muje wybory, a właściwie w oparciu o co powinien je podejmować. Inspiracją do napisa-
nia tego tekstu były osobiste doświadczenia autorki, które wskazują na brak optymizmu 
w ocenie kondycji moralnej współczesnego człowieka.
Słowa kluczowe
normy, wartości, płaszczyzna aksjonormatywna, etyka codzienności
